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Judges in their Own Case: A Lockean Critique of Law Enforcement Asset Sharing in Drug Forfeiture Law and PracticeThis article is an exercise in applied political theory. It applies the Lockean paradigm of political liberty, republican government, and the rule of law to one facet of current drug asset forfeiture policy-that of sharing forfeited assets with law enforcement agencies that initiate forfeitures (asset sharing). It is concluded that asset sharing violates fundamental political precepts, i.e., Lockean precepts, on which American government is founded. The key principle is that public servants' official actions must be guided by law: by policies enacted by the majority will and for the public good. Once public officers engage in official activity primarily for personal or institutional self-aggrandizement, they become judges in their own case and thus violate a basic principle of civil government. Even though asset sharing is authorized by statute, requires judicial authorization in some instances, and would probably be deemed constitutional, it violates Lockean principles nonetheless. Asset sharing has been publicly criticized because it has led to a number of egregious abuses, but it is the author's belief that, even if all abuses could be prevented, asset sharing must still be ended. This article advances a "substantive" and a "methodological" goal. Substantively, it joins a chorus of policy and legal critics of federal drug asset forfeiture policy. The methodological goal isto encourage application of political-theoretical analysis to the multidisciplinary field of criminal justice.
Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 21, No. 2,
197-230 (1996) This article has been cited by other articles:
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