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Locally Elected Sheriffs and Money Compensation

A Quantitative Analysis of Organizational and Environmental Contingency Explanations

Western Washington University

This study uses OLS and a large sample of U.S. counties to empirically assess diverse explanations for pay allocated to local sheriffs. After statistically holding constant effects of agency size and functional specialization, including jail operations, this study isolates diverse environmental sources of variation in money wages allocated to the elected sheriff. A strong tax base helps local sheriffs, as does income inequality associated with the presence of high income earners, but local conservative political support is associated with reduced wage allocations. High crime rates and local unemployment are closely associated with expanded money wages, but pay is limited in counties with a large impoverished population. The empirical results are consistent with an environmental contingency model. One implication from this analysis is that county sheriffs are compensated at rates that reflect patterns of uncertainty in the organization's localized external environment.

Key Words: sheriff agencies • law enforcement • discretion • wage inequality • executive compensation • budgeting • contingency theory

Criminal Justice Review, Vol. 33, No. 1, 5-28 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0734016808315588


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